More than a month into Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the strategic dynamics of the war are driving a deep wedge between Europe and Russia. If we are to believe last week, the gap between the West and Russia has widened further in the name of an issue that comes directly from American rhetoric: that of “human rights”. The media focus on the Boutcha massacre, attributed to Russian occupying forces, has led to a turning point in Europe's reaction.
American pressure is already bearing its first fruits. The main chancelleries in Western Europe have confirmed their desire to rearm massively, or at least to reach the 2% of GDP allocated to the defense budget historically demanded by NATO, while accepting the isolation of Russia. The acceleration of an energy diversification already partly perceived as inevitable is widely shared. This week, a debate on a potential oil and gas embargo on Russia has been opened in Brussels as the Baltic republics have stopped, or are about to stop, importing hydrocarbons from Russia. The German economy minister said that Germany was working to "create the preconditions and the steps towards an embargo" although - as we have already explained in relation to gas - this poses difficulties for this country, at least for the time being. Added to this is the bellicose tone, more than predictable, adopted by the countries of Eastern Europe, even ready to accept millions of refugees in the name of a strong weakening of Russian power.
Statements by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in early March, asserting that the sanctions "are a kind of tax on the sovereignty" of Russia, launched only because of "enormous pressure" from the United States, but that "...this wave of hysteria will pass, our Western partners will overcome it" [1], sounds more out of step with reality every day, while the calls for more and harsher sanctions are multiplying. A barrage of Western sanctions and punitive measures against Russia which is creating a new iron curtain.
Tactical results in the military field and, above all, the duration of the conflict between one ceasefire and the next could slow or alter this trajectory, but they are unlikely to modify it, at least as long as the war remains limited to Ukrainian theatre. The sanctions will be difficult to withdraw, not only as long as the war lasts, but also because of the development of a general Russophobia, which recalls the climate which was installed against the Muslims after September 11, the consequences of which are still being felt. felt, even exacerbated, in several countries. The reality is that from now on the only certainty is the inexorability of a split between the West and Russia unless there is a change in Russian leadership and a new government of a Yeltsin type is imposed. Even if some of the sanctions were to be lifted as part of a peace agreement in Ukraine, it is difficult to envisage a return to the situation before February 24 in relations between the two countries. This does not mean that over the years the Western powers will not be able to modulate the degree of separation with Russia, but the status quo ante should never be restored.
This new geopolitical reality realigns all actors in Europe. This is the case of the countries of Eastern Europe, in particular the two pro-American bastions of the East, Poland in the lead and Romania in second, aspire to the status of Atlantic avant-garde and count on the Washington Military Umbrella. Their anti-Russian momentum is exacerbated by Great Britain which plays more than ever, in a period of decline of which Brexit is the expression, a role in the service of the United States. This is also the case of other countries like France, which, despite its stated ambitions for autonomy and greatness, is de facto subordinated to the strategy of the United States. Finally, others who have made a historic turnaround, like Germany and its historic rearmament, are wondering in which direction to direct their new geopolitical weight. A decision that will determine the future of Europe in the years, even decades, to come.
These strategic choices are difficult insofar as, in terms of economic and social peace, it is the various European countries which, after Russia, will be the losers of this war. However, this central element could open the way to revolutionary processes that could change the reactionary and warlike dynamics that are imposing themselves on the Old Continent. What is clear is that an era is ending and that the relatively peaceful post-Cold War Europe - if we forget the precedent of the Balkan wars, notably the imperialist intervention in Kosovo in 1999 - coming to an end. Economic, geopolitical and class struggle instability is returning to the heart of Europe.
Russia's aggression against Ukraine destroys the appearance of neutrality in the concert of European nations. Like Sweden, and more, Finland is preparing to formalize its application for NATO membership. A recent poll indicates that 62% of respondents would like to join NATO. At the same time, the Finnish and Swedish armed forces are already almost unified. Together with NATO members Norway and Denmark, they will play a dual role for Washington: containing Russia on the Arctic/Baltic front and discouraging Chinese attempts at a northern silk road.
But the most important thing is elsewhere. The rearmament of Germany is a major geopolitical change. The world's fourth largest economy, after the United States, China and Japan, is now set to become the third military power after the United States and China and the first in Europe. The list of planned expenditures includes a considerable increase in ammunition, more than a dozen fighter bombers and helicopters for troop transport, etc. Germany even wants to equip itself with a ballistic missile shield of the Arrow type, the jewel of Israeli armament, which, in its most modern version, could even intercept hypersonic missiles. And the same is true in all areas of armament. Although the German menu does not yet include the atomic bomb, people are starting to talk about it in Berlin. Self-limitation to peacekeeping missions is a thing of the past.
Admittedly, it will take some time to move from writing to practice, especially in the face of the strong anti-militarism that still permeates German society at all levels, but from the government's point of view, the path is clear. Although still the furthest behind in geo-economics in years, notably under Mrs. Merkel's chancellery, the process of developing a national security strategy has begun on a large scale. Abolished from the public vocabulary for seventy years, geopolitics and its derivatives are reappearing in the thinking of German analysts and decision-makers.
The obstacles are immense. On the one hand, the management of the relationship with France will pose some problems. This is ultra-sensitive to the level of armament across the Rhine, offended by Scholz's choice to buy American F-35 fighters and, above all, jealous of losing its military primacy on the continent. Second, Germany should not unduly worry the United States, historically suspicious of Germany by integrating the Bundeswehr along the forward eastern front where members of the Atlantic Alliance concentrate their common resources to prevent a Russian invasion. Finally, the most important obstacle is the tragic memory of the German invasion of Russia during the Second World War. Going from Ostpolitik, the constant of the last half-century of German foreign policy, to military deployment against Moscow is far from simple.
Now, if the massive rearmament of Germany makes sense, it is so that Berlin assumes a role of leading power, with the support of the United States, in the hottest continental sector. This means that, in the not too distant future, friction between Moscow and Berlin will be inevitable and probably long-lasting. Some analysts are already talking about this particular responsibility of Germany. Ulrich Speck, a renowned analyst at the German Marshall Fund in Berlin, asserts that "the open war against Ukraine has clearly shown where the center of gravity of German foreign and security policy is for the years to come: in Central Europe and eastern”. The focus is on Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, but also on Georgia and Armenia. Putin's aggression “forces us to have a much stronger presence in the region”. He added emphatically: “...we expect Germany to finally translate its economic strength into military strength, in order to create an anti-Russian counterweight”. Above all, “Germany must learn to reconnect with power, in particular military power”. The conclusion is clear: “If a major European state like Germany gives up defining its interests and acting in terms of power politics, aggressive actors like Russia will fill the void” [2].
Putin's military adventure has changed the geopolitical coordinates between Washington and Berlin, with both sides realizing they need each other while the former recognizes the importance of a strong and determined German geopolitical power in the sides of Western nations.
The dual containment strategy of China and Russia for fear of Berlin's autonomous policy towards the East has prevented such convergence for years, a contradiction that persists - with moments of greater rapprochement and of greatest friction like the Iraq War in 2003 - since the imperialist unification of Germany in 1990. now seeks to neutralize the weakest partner of the Eurasian axis by completing the decoupling between Russia and Europe already begun in 2014. A difficult option until recently, as evidenced by the Nordstream affair (the direct gas pipeline between Russia and Germany), strongly defended by Chancellor Merkel, but which suddenly imposed itself with Russia's aggression against Ukraine.
In terms of planetary balance, the United States seeks to reduce Russia to the rank of reduced partner of China. For this, Washington tactically needs a real partner in Europe because it can no longer guarantee the Old Continent the same security as in the past. This does not mean that Washington is going to leave European soil, quite the contrary, because the idea of building permanent bases in the Eastern European countries that are members of the Atlantic Alliance - where, before the annexation of the Crimea by Russia in 2014 there were no NATO combat troops - come and go. But it needs partners with the economic, geopolitical and military weight that only German imperialism can give it. It could thus contain Moscow and curb Turkish ambitions in Southern Europe and the Mediterranean, while the United States would focus on the Indo-Pacific with its regional allies. Both sides would cooperate economically to establish strong and secure supply chains, independent of systemic rivals of the so-called “liberal” order. A politicization or geopoliticization of capitalist “globalization” that could profoundly change the very nature of this capitalist conquest of recent decades. The fact that, for the first time this week, top diplomats from Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand attended the meeting of NATO foreign ministers bears witness to the plan Washington's long term. The union of Atlantic and Indo-Pacific allies can prove very useful if - as seems to be the case - the objective is to confront Russia and China at the same time.
Whether all of this is feasible, when the costs are immense as well as the dangers and risks, is another question, especially since a cornered Russia could use tactical nuclear weapons to prolong the conflict and once again divide the Western partners. In another sense, it's doubtful that the new US-German partnership against Russia will stand the test of time, given the former's historic mistrust of a European power that has been Germany's rival. America from its unification at the end of the 19th century until the end of the Second World War. Not to mention the political unpredictability of the United States itself - one of the most disconcerting factors in this unprecedented international situation - not only in the run-up to the midterm elections, but also in 2024, where a new Trump presidency is a possibility.
Nor can we ignore that the rediscovered unity of the West does not mean that it will extend its presence throughout the peripheral and semi-colonial world, where China's influence is greater than in Europe. However, these countries bring together the majority of the world's population and their governments do not want to side with either the Russians or the Americans. In particular, the rejection by India - which for Washington is a key linchpin of anti-China containment - and South Africa of US resolutions condemning Moscow at the UN General Assembly is a tough pill to swallow for the great power of the North.
Finally, it is necessary to underline the probable economic crisis and the specter of the class struggle which sweeps the world, in particular the semi-colonial countries, due to the rise in the prices of raw materials, foodstuffs and energy, after the failures that the global economy has already shown during the pandemic and its recovery. In Europe, the President of the European Central Bank, Christine Lagarde, called on citizens to hold "in this period of uncertainty" and warned that the war in Ukraine is not only a human tragedy, but "also a shock economic hub, due to our proximity to Russia and our dependence on its gas and oil". This situation is particularly felt in Germany. In the once-stable capitalist powerhouse, consumer prices rose 7.3% in March 2021, the highest rate of inflation on record in more than 40 years, comparable only to peaks in the 1970s.
The first thing to do to stop the deep war forces that have been set in motion is to be clear about the enemy's strategic plan and the designs for the current war that are being developed more in Washington than in Moscow. To use a metaphor, we could say that seeing the "tree" of the war in Ukraine as separate from the global "forest" is at the origin of the adaptation to NATO of a large part of the left-wing organizations. The most emblematic case of this position is perhaps that of Gilbert Achcar with whom we have already argued. In a recent letter to Alex Callinicos, he states: "But it turns out that the Ukrainian resistance has broken the myth of the omnipotence of the Russian army, and that it could go further and completely defeat the imperialist objectives. of Russia (always within the limits set by the huge imbalance of forces). And I think it strengthens our anti-war argument against the growing tendency to inflate the importance of the 'Russian threat' to justify increased military spending and NATO expansion.” After what we have just written, such a thought is at best pure naivety (which we doubt from a leading intellectual like Achcar), at worst an outright accommodation with NATO. In today's world, where war and crises are making a violent comeback, there is no real alternative to avoid warlike or even nuclear armageddon without a proletarian revolution. Rosa Luxemburg's slogan “socialism or barbarism” has never been so topical.
[1] “Lavrov expects solution to Ukraine issue to be found, West to get over hysteria", Agencia Tass 3/3/2022.
[2] "Warum Deutschland dringend eine neue Oststrategie braucht", Ulrich Speck, Der Spiegel, 13/3/2022.
Keywords
War in Ukraine/ War/ Belarus/ Class struggle/ Germany/ Russia/ USA/ China/ World
